Article 17 — Innovation-related award criteria
In brief
This Article requires public buyers to award R&D procurement contracts to the tender offering the best quality for money, assessed through the best price-quality ratio method. Quality award criteria must carry at least half of the total weighting, and buyers must apply specific innovation-related criteria designed to measure a tender’s impact on innovation and its added value for the Union. It also sets minimum and maximum weightings for those innovation criteria and general requirements for how all award criteria are framed.
Key points
- Contracts are awarded on the best price-quality ratio, with the combined weight of all quality criteria at least 50% of the total; the price criterion relates only to price, and total cost of ownership counts within its share.
- Quality criteria may address technical merit, design and accessibility, environmental, climate, social and innovation objectives, security interests, and the quality of staff and work organisation.
- All award criteria must be non-discriminatory, proportionate, specific, objective and measurable, with safeguards against irregularities and no unrestricted freedom of choice for the buyer.
- Mandatory innovation-related criteria include the degree of innovativeness, total cost of ownership and long-term benefits, impact on the Union’s technology supply chain and innovation ecosystem, the share of activities carried out in the Union, and the integration of Union-developed technologies.
- The combined weight of all innovation-related criteria must be at least 15% of the total, while certain of those criteria together must not exceed 15%; the obligation does not apply to procedures whose only subject is the listed R&D consultancy services.
What it means in practice
Contracting authorities must design evaluation models that give real weight to quality and innovation rather than defaulting to lowest price, and must be able to demonstrate that their criteria are objective and measurable. Innovative firms, start-ups and SMEs are rewarded for the substance of their proposed innovation, long-term value and contribution to the Union’s technology base and ecosystem. Where a tender proposes activities in the Union or integrates Union-developed technologies and research results, those factors can attract award points within the set limits.
Official text — Article 17 (COM(2026) 567)
1. Public buyers shall award the contract to the economic operator that offers the best
quality for money. To that effect, public buyers shall evaluate the tenders received
according to the best price -quality ratio method. To determine the best price -quality
ratio, public buyers shall evaluate the tenders through a comparison of their price,
and quality, the latter based on quality criteria linked to the subject matter of the
R&D procurement contract. Costs can also be taken into account when determining
the best price -quality ratio. When evaluating the tenders based on the best price -
quality method, t he combined weight of all quality award criteria shall represent at
least 50% of the total weighting of all award criteria. The price crite rion shall only
relate to the price of the tender. The weighting given to criteria related to the total
cost of ownership shall be counted within the respective percentage share.
2. Quality criteria shall refer to any criteria used to assess the degree to which a tender
proposes beneficial, efficient or sustainable outcomes in relation to the subject-matter
of the R&D procurement contract.
The quality of the tender may, for instance, relate to the following aspects:
(a) technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, accessibility, design
for all users, research and development methods;
(b) environmental, climate-related, social and innovation objectives in accordance
with Article 4(6), security and public safety interests in accordance with Article
28, or European preference requirements where a public buyer applies those
requirements in the form of an allocation of award points;
(c) quality of the staff assigned that can significantly impact the level of
performance of the contract, such as the organisation, qualification and
experience of the staff assigned to performing the R&D procurement contract;
(d) quality of the organisation of the work, quality of the allocation of resources
assigned to performing the R&D procurement contract;
3. Award criteria shall be non -discriminatory, proportionate, specific, objective and
measurable; they shall be evaluated in a process containing sufficient safeguards
against irregularities. They shall allow the public buyer to effectively compare the
strengths and weaknesses of the offered R&D services and shall not have the effect
of conferring an unrestricted freedom of choice on the public buyer.
4. In R&D procurement procedures, public buyers shall apply, as part of the quality
award criteria referred to in paragraph 2, specific quality award criteria designed to
measure the potential impact of the tenders on innovation and on creating added
value for the Union. Such innovation -related quality award criteria, as referred to in
paragraph 2(e) of this Article, shall include the following:
(a) the degree of innovativeness of the tender and the extent to which this degree
of innovativeness contributes to the overall quality of the proposal that is to be
researched, developed or tested during the R&D procurement, where possible
by using quality criteria that are specific to the intended results of the R&D
procurement;
(b) the total cost of ownership and long -term benefits of the tender, including the
impact of any value engineering approach that is proposed in the tender on
those costs and benefits;
(c) the impact of the tender on reinforcing the technology supply chain an d
developing an innovation ecosystem in the Union, including for critical
technologies;
(d) the share of the value of the activities that are proposed to be carried out in the
Union as a part of the R&D procurement contract;
(e) where applicable, the exten t to which the tender proposes to integrate
technologies developed in the Union, including research and development
results stemming from publicly funded research and development programmes
in the internal market and makes use of tools, such as standards, specifications,
software or models or other technology developed in the Union.
5. Public buyers may apply other innovation -related award criteria in addition to those
laid down in the paragraph 4. The combined weight of all innovation -related award
criteria shall be at least 15% of the total weight of all award criteria, and the
combined weight of the innovation -related award criteria referred to in paragraph 1,
points (c), (d) and (e) shall not exceed 15% of the total weight of all award criteria.
The innovation-related award criteria are part of the quality award criteria referred to
in paragraph 2.
6. By way of derogation from paragraph 4 and 5, the obligation to apply innovation -
related award criteria pursuant to this Article shall not apply to R&D proc urement
procedures which have as their only subject the procurement of research and
development consultancy services as covered by CPV codes 73200000 -4, 73210000-
7 and 73220000-0.
Source: European Commission, proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Innovation Act, COM(2026) 567 final, 9 September 2026. Read the official proposal (PDF). Text may change during the legislative process.
Anthony Bochon’s analysis
The award stage is where the Regulation’s policy ambitions become operational, and the choice is unambiguous: contracts go to the best price-quality ratio, with quality criteria carrying at least 50% of the total weighting. That firmly displaces lowest-price thinking, and the dedicated innovation-related criteria — degree of innovativeness, total cost of ownership and long-term benefit, reinforcement of the Union’s technology supply chain, and the share of activities carried out in the Union — give buyers a structured way to reward genuine advance rather than incremental compliance, with a floor of 15% for innovation criteria as a whole.
What I would watch most carefully is the European-preference dimension embedded in paragraph 4, points (c) to (e), and its 15% cap: rewarding the integration of technologies developed in the Union and the location of activities within it is coherent industrial policy, but it sits close to the boundaries of the Union’s international procurement commitments and will need to be applied on objective, measurable and non-discriminatory terms to withstand challenge. My advice to addressees is to build the innovation narrative and the value-engineering case into the tender from the outset, because under this method quality and demonstrable Union added value, not price, will decide the outcome.