Chapter 4 — Final provisionsProposed — COM(2026) 567
Article 39 — Exercise of the delegation
In brief
This article sets the conditions under which the Commission may adopt delegated acts under the European Innovation Act. The power is conferred for a period of five years from the Regulation’s entry into force and is tacitly extended for further five-year periods unless the European Parliament or the Council objects. It also lays down how the delegation can be revoked, how experts are consulted, and how the Parliament and Council can object to individual delegated acts.
Key points
The delegation applies to several specified articles of the Regulation and lasts five years, with tacit renewal unless there is opposition.
The European Parliament or the Council may revoke the delegation at any time, without affecting acts already in force.
Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission must consult experts designated by each Member State, in line with the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making.
Each delegated act is notified simultaneously to the Parliament and the Council.
An act enters into force only if neither institution objects within two months, a period extendable by a further two months.
What it means in practice
This is a procedural framework rather than a substantive rule for addressees. It matters because much of the technical detail of the Regulation may be filled in later through delegated acts. Firms, public buyers, IP holders and their advisers can expect further specification over time, adopted under the controls set out here and subject to scrutiny by the Parliament and the Council.
Anthony Bochon’s analysis
This article is the constitutional plumbing of the Act, and it repays careful reading. The Commission receives delegated powers across a striking spread of provisions — from Article 11(2) through to Article 31(8) — for a renewable five-year term, tempered by the usual safeguards: prior consultation of Member State experts under the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement, simultaneous notification, and a right of revocation and objection reserved to the European Parliament and the Council. In my view, the breadth of the delegation is the point to scrutinise, because it shifts substantial normative choices from the co-legislators to the executive.
Two details deserve attention. First, the drafting is not yet clean — the enabling list in paragraph 3 diverges from paragraph 2 (Article 7(2) and Article 19(11) appear where one expects 11(2) and 19(10)), the kind of cross-reference slip that Parliament and Council legal-linguistic review should correct. Second, the two-month objection window, extendable by a further two months, gives the co-legislators a real but time-limited veto; I would expect the scope of these delegations to be a live point of negotiation, with the institutions pressing to narrow or better circumscribe them.
Official text — Article 39 (COM(2026) 567)
1. The power to adopt delegated act s is conferred on the Commission subject to the
conditions laid down in this Article.
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 11(2), Article19(10), Article
22(5), Article 24(12), Article 28(5) and Article 31(8) shall be conferred on the
Commission for a period of five years from the entry into force of this Regulation.
The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not
later than nine months before the end of the five -year period. The delegation of
power shal l be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the
European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three
months before the end of each period.
3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 7(2), Article 19(1 1), Article 22(5),
Article 24(12), Article 28(5) and Article 31(8) may be revoked at any time by the
European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the
delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effec t on the day
following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European
+ OJ: Please insert in the text the number, date, title and OJ reference of the present Regulation (European
Innovation Act) in the footnote.
Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any
delegated acts already in force.
4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Comm ission shall consult experts designated by
each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the
Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.
5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simu ltaneously to
the European Parliament and to the Council.
6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 11(2), Article 19(10), Article 22(5),
Article 24(12), Article 28(5) and Article 31(8) shall enter into force only if no
objection has been expressed ei ther by the European Parliament or by the Council
within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament
and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and
the Council have both informed the C ommission that they will not object. That
period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament
or of the Council.
Source: European Commission, proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Innovation Act, COM(2026) 567 final, 9 September 2026. Read the official proposal (PDF). Text may change during the legislative process.
Anthony Bochon’s analysis
This article is the constitutional plumbing of the Act, and it repays careful reading. The Commission receives delegated powers across a striking spread of provisions — from Article 11(2) through to Article 31(8) — for a renewable five-year term, tempered by the usual safeguards: prior consultation of Member State experts under the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement, simultaneous notification, and a right of revocation and objection reserved to the European Parliament and the Council. In my view, the breadth of the delegation is the point to scrutinise, because it shifts substantial normative choices from the co-legislators to the executive.
Two details deserve attention. First, the drafting is not yet clean — the enabling list in paragraph 3 diverges from paragraph 2 (Article 7(2) and Article 19(11) appear where one expects 11(2) and 19(10)), the kind of cross-reference slip that Parliament and Council legal-linguistic review should correct. Second, the two-month objection window, extendable by a further two months, gives the co-legislators a real but time-limited veto; I would expect the scope of these delegations to be a live point of negotiation, with the institutions pressing to narrow or better circumscribe them.